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Nonaggressive Sanctions in the International
Sports Arena
by James A.R. Nafziger*
I. INTRODUCTION
Olympia glitters and overshadows every other contest.1
oday's observer of the Olympic Games might reverse Pindar's
lines: all other contests-military, political and economic-seem to
overshadow Olympia. Within the international sports arena, some of the
glitter is of rather tarnished gold, some of the shadow ominous. The
Olympic Games blend cultural ideals and political-economic realities.
Rule 9 of the Olympic Charter provides that the Olympic Games "are
contests between individuals and teams, and not between countries, ' 2 but
the Olympic motto--"faster, higher, stronger"--rings in the ears of ath-
letes and political leaders alike. Still, the interlocking rings of the
Olympic flag and symbol remind one of the peaceful and fraternal values
which keep the Olympic torch alive in the human conscience.
As sports and political arenas merge, connections between sports and
political sanctions emerge. Thus, international sports competition func-
tions partly as a nonaggressive sanction. Although its cathartic capacity
to diminish aggressive impulses may be doubtful,4 international competi-
tion nevertheless offers a highly visible alternative in the global living
room.
Politics can, however, defeat an athlete. The history of international
sports competition is replete with political threats and these threats will
probably persist.5 The Canadian denial of visas to Taiwanese entrants in
* Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. B.A. (1962), M.A. (1969),
University of Wisconsin; J.D., Harvard University (1967).
' Pindar, quoted in Economides, Olympic Games: A Return to Olympia, 1 HE-LENIC
REV. INV'L REL. 168 (1980).
1 Olympic Charter (1983).
3 Id. at Rule 6, translated from "Citius, Altius, Fortius."
4 Litschen, Cooperation, Association, and Contest, 14 J. CoNFLIcT REsOLUTION 21
(1970); HeinilS, Notes on the Inter-Group Conflicts in International Sport, 1 IN'L RFv.
SPoRTs Soc. 31 (1966).
' Nafziger & Strenk, The Political Uses and Abuses of Sports, 10 CoNN. L. REV. 259,
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the Montreal Games and the U.S.-led boycott of the Moscow Games are
only the latest instances of geopolitical threats to athletes.
Given such threats, one must distinguish between the use and abuse
of sports competition as a nonaggressive sanction. To clarify this distinc-
tion, it is useful to identify six political uses of international sports com-
petition: international cooperation, national ideology and propaganda, of-
ficial prestige, diplomatic recognition and nonrecognition, protest, and
conflict.6 Of these, only diplomatic nonrecognition and conflict are clearly
improper uses of sports competition, although variations on the other
uses may constitute unfriendly acts. By far the greatest controversy sur-
rounds the use of sports as protest in the form of official embargoes and
boycotts. These activities constitute the principal threat to athletes and
pose important legal questions.
II. THE LAW
A. The General Rules of Retorsion and Reprisal
Under what circumstances, then, are nonaggressive sanctions against
sports competition illegal? Examples of illegal conduct are the use of
sports as a pretext for conflict or for engaging in measures of coercion
under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,7 and the diplomatic use
of power over sports competition to confirm diplomatic nonrecognition in
violation of governing rules. Canada's refusal to issue visas to members of
the Taiwanese Olympic team in 1976 is a salient example of such a viola-
tion.8 The most important issues relate, however, to the use of sport for
official protest. Embargoes on competitors and boycotts on competition
are the typical vehicles of protest.
Embargoes and boycotts are at least unfriendly acts. If, however,
they are within a legally protected range of retaliatory sanctions, embar-
goes and boycotts may be acceptable measures of retorsion. To be accept-
able, they must not violate Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,
must conform to state practice and must obey general principles of law.
For example, trade embargoes that do not violate the GATT, treaties of
establishment, or other international law are generally regarded as ac-
ceptable measures of retorsion.9
260-61, passim (1978).
6 Id. at 261, 280-89.
" "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para.
4.
8 Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 5, at 281-83.
' A retorsion is defined as "an unfriendly act or acts whereby one State answers objec-
tionable (though not necessarily illegal) conduct of another State in a retaliatory manner."
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Embargoes and boycotts may even be acceptable as reprisal measures
against illegal acts of another state. To be considered acceptable, they
must be reasonable. The three conditions enunciated in the Naulilaa In-
cident Arbitration0 best define the legitimate application of reprisals.
These conditions are: (a) that the State against which reprisals are taken
must have itself violated international law; (b) that prior to the reprisal
measure, the initiating State must have attempted without success to ob-
tain redress from the other State for the consequences of its illegal con-
duct; and (c) that the reprisals should not be excessive, that is, the repri-
sals should be necessary and not out of proportion with the act which
motivated them. Thus, boycotts or embargoes may be acceptable as
reprisals
after an unsatisfied demand to an act contrary to international law on
the part of the offending state. They have the effect of suspending mo-
mentarily in the relations of the two states the observance of this or that
rule of international law. They are limited by the experience of humanity
and the rules of good faith, applicable in the relations of state with state.
They would be illegal if a previous act contrary to international law had
not furnished the reason for them. They aim to impose on the offending
state reparation for the offense or the return to legality in avoidance of
new offenses."
It is no accident, therefore, that states tend to justify self-help mea-
sures in terms of reparation, deterrence, or both. For example, in the
rather garbled aftermath of the United States' decision to compel a boy-
cott by the United States Olympic Committee of the Moscow Games, 12
the Carter Administration argued principles of diplomatic protection of
nationals, deterrence and retribution. The President first justified the
boycott on the grounds of a presumed danger to United States athletes
and spectators, 3 and, later on the grounds of deterring future aggression
and sending the Soviets a "a signal of world outrage.' 1 4 The Secretary of
State, however, viewed the boycott as retribution for the Soviet violation
of what he thought was a principle against contemporaneous involvement
by a sovereign host in open warfare.' 5
J. STONE, LEGAL CoNTROLs OF INTERNATIONAL CoNFLicT 288 (1959).
10 Portugal v. Germany, [1928] 2 U.N.R.LA.A. 1012 (1949).
12 Id. at 1017.
12 See Nafziger, Diplomatic Fun and the Games: A Commentary on the United States
Boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics, 17 WmLAmmrE L. REv. 67 (1980). Throughout the
remainder of this article, for simplicity's sake, the terms "embargo" and "boycott" will be
used interchangeably.
13 80 DEP'T ST. BuLL., Jan. 1980, at Special-B.
11 80 DFa'T ST. BuLL., Mar. 1980, at 51.
15 Id. at 50. The following dialogue took place at a presidential news conference Febru-
ary 13, 1980:
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B. The Olympic Legal Framework
To appraise the validity of sports embargoes and boycotts, it is es-
sential to go beyond the customary law governing retaliation by examin-
ing the special regime of international sports law. The Olympic Charter
best evidences international custom pertaining to sports competition,
Olympic or not. The Rules of the Charter are administered by a "supreme
authority,""' the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The IOC is a
body corporate by international law having juridical status and perpetual
succession.11 Although a nongovernmental organization,' the I0C plays a
role on behalf of the global community analogous to the International
Committee of the Red Cross in implementing humanitarian stipulations
Q. You have said that the Soviets have to be made to pay a price for invading Afghani-
stan, and your counsel has said that our boycott of the Olympics is not intended to be
punitive. How do you explain the seeming difference between these two positions?
A. We have no desire to use the Olympics to punish, except the Soviets attach a major
degree of importance to the holding of the Olympics in the Soviet Union. In their own
propaganda material, they claim that the willingness of the International Olympic Commit-
tee to let the games be held in Moscow is an endorsement of the foreign policy and the
peace-loving nature of the Soviet Union.
To me it's unconscionable for any nation to send athletes to the capital of a national
under the aegis of the Olympics when that nation-that host nation-is actively involved in
the invasion of and the subjugation of innocent people. And so, for that reason, I don't
believe that we are at all obligated to send our athletes to Moscow.
And I would like to repeat, if the Soviet Union does not withdraw its troops from Af-
ghanistan by the 20th of this month, then neither I nor the American people nor the Con-
gress will support the sending of an Olympic team to Moscow this summer.
80 DEPT ST. BuLL., Mar. 1980, at Special-D.
16 Olympic Charter, supra note 2, at Rule 4. Rule 23 of the Olympic Charter provides,
also, that "[t]he I0C is the final authority on all questions concerning the Olympic Games
and the Olympic movement."
17 Olympic Charter, supra note 2, at Rule 11.
s "The I0C was created by the Congress of Paris of 23rd June, 1894; it was entrusted
with the control and development of the modern Olympic Games.
"It is a body corporate by international law having juridical status and perpetual suc-
cession. Its headquarters are in Switzerland. It is not formed for profit...." Olympic Char-
ter, supra note 2, at Rule 11.
"The IOC is a permanent organization. It selects such persons as it considers qualified
to be members, provided that they speak French or English and are citizens of and reside in
a country which possesses an NOC recognized by the IOC. The IOC welcomes them into
membership with a brief ceremony during which they accept the required obligations and
responsibilities.
"There shall be only one member in any country except in the largest and most active
countries in the Olympic movement, and in those where the Olympic Games have been held,
where they may be a maximum of two.
"Members of the IOC are representatives of the I0C in their countries and not their
delegates to the IOC. They may not accept from governments or from any organizations or
individuals instructions which shall in any way bind them or interfere with the indepen-
dence of their vote. . . ." Olympic Charter, supra note 2, at Rule 12.
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in time of war or other emergency.
The Olympic Charter provides that "[e]very person or organization
that plays any part whatsoever in the Olympic movement shall accept the
supreme authority of the IOC and shall be bound by its Rules and submit
to its jurisdiction."19 Although the Olympic Movement, being nongovern-
mental, cannot in itself compel state obedience, its rules best evidence
custom. For example, a 1977 Belgian court decision, confirming the posi-
tion of the French courts, the Council of Europe, and the High Court of
Justice of the European Communities, ruled that the international rules
of sport supersede conflicting national policies and laws.20 The Second
Conference of European Sports Ministers adopted a resolution that ex-
plicitly confirmed the authority of the Olympic Charter.21 Furthermore,
leading publicists have established the authority of the Olympic Rules in
the international sports arena.22
C. The Substantive Rules of International Sports Law
The principal safeguards against unwarranted intrusion by govern-
ments into the sports arena are found in Rules 3, 9, and 24. Rule 3, one of
the cornerstones of international sports law, provides that "[n]o discrimi-
nation.., is allowed against any country or person on grounds of race,
religion, or politics."2 s Rule 9 states that "[t]he Games are contests be-
tween individuals and teams and not between countries." Rule 24 obli-
gates National Olympic Committees (NOCs) to be autonomous, to resist
all political pressures, and to enforce the rules and Bye-laws of the OC 2 5
Further, Rule 24 provides that "NOCs shall be the sole authorities re-
sponsible for the representation of their respective countries at the
Olympic Games .... ,,26 Bye-law 8 to Rule 24 defines the term "represen-
tation" to cover the decision to participate. 27 Violations of the rules, such
as yielding to political pressures, expose NOCs to penalties.28 Thus, gov-
ernmental intrusion into these rules of custom is abusive.
19 Olympic Charter, supra note 2, at Rule 4.
"o See Bondoux, Law and Sport, 1978 OLYMPic REv. 494, at 501-02; Garrigues, The
Impact of Community Law on Physical and Sports Activities, 1979 OLYMPIC Rav. 345.
21 Resolution adopted by the Second Conference of European Ministers Responsible for
Sport, London, April 4-7, 1978, reprinted in 1978 OLYMPic Rnv., at 391. For further back-
ground, see Howell, Governmental Responsibilities in Sport, 1978 OLYMPIc Rav., at 209.
2 Silance, Interaction of the Rules in Sports Law and the Laws and Treaties Made by
Public Authorities, 1977 OLYmPIc REv., at 619, 622, 627.
23 Olympic Charter, supra note 2, at Rule 3 (emphasis added).
Id. at Rule 9.
2 Id. at Rule 24.
16 Id. at Rule 24(B).
17 Id. at Bye-law 8 to Rule 24.
Id. at Rule 25.
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The Helsinki Accords, 29 whatever their authority today, articulate
normative support for this rule structure. The Accords, signed by the So-
viet Union, the United States, Canada, and all European countries except
Albania, provide that: "In order to expand existing links and co-operation
in the field of sport, the participating State will encourage contacts and
exchanges of this kind, including sports meetings and competitions of all
sorts, on the basis of the established international rules, regulations and
practice."0 These rules are not simply technical "rules of the game,"
such as the length of the playing field; rather, they are the customary
rules, largely defined by the Olympic Charter, of international sports
relations.31
Ill. DIsCUSSION
A state may impose a sports boycott either to restrict participation
by its nationals in foreign competition or to restrict access by foreign ath-
letes to competition on its territory. Whether the restriction attaches to
the outflow or the inflow of athletes does not, however, determine its le-
gitimacy under international law. The threshold question is the purpose,
not the nature of the boycott.
States usually impose sports boycotts for one of two purposes: To
combat apartheid and racial discrimination, or to implement geopolitical
strategy, generally along the East-West axis. Sports boycotts for the first
purpose are generally legitimate whereas boycotts for the second purpose
may or may not be. Let us look at each of these categories.
A. Boycotts to Combat Apartheid and Racial Discrimination
Although Olympic Rule 3 prohibits discrimination against "any coun-
2' Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, re-
printed in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CSCE]. For bibliographies of litera-
ture pertaining to the Accords, see Dm'T ST. NEwsLrr (Oct. 1980), at 60; Granier,
Human Rights and the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: An
Annotated Bibliography of United States Government Documents, 13 VAND. J. TRmASNAT'L
L. 529 (1980). The European signatories are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslo-
vakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. Canada and the United States also signed the Accords. Even
though the Accords technically are not legally binding, they provide at least a morally com-
pelling, comprehensive expression of norms to guide the behavior of the signatory states.
so CSCE, supra note 29, at 1315.
The qualifying adjective "international" in a code or agreement such as the Helsinki
Accords is properly construed to refer to the relations among nations at the more or less
governmental level.
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try or person on grounds of ... politics,""2 discrimination by states
against South African athletes, for example, may be legitimate as a retali-
atory measure against discrimination by the South African government
on the basis of race, which is likewise proscribed by Rule 3. What must be
shown is not just a general pattern of discrimination by the state whose
nationals are targeted by the boycott, but specific discrimination in the
training, team selection and integration of amateur athletes. This is not
apt to be a troublesome refinement. Somewhat more troublesome is the
distinction drawn by Rule 9, providing that the Games are "contests be-
tween individuals and teams and not between countries."3 3 Broadly inter-
preted, any sports sanction is abusive whose purpose is to contest another
state or its policies. More narrowly read, however, Rule 9 may be only
advisory or, if operational, limited to the mode of physical competition
within the sports arena.
In any event, the "soft" law of the Olympic Rules must be inter-
preted to conform to more general rules and principles. Most importantly,
apartheid and official racism violate fundamental human rights. As a
matter of jus cogens, those violations may conflict with peremptory
norms of human rights, no derogation from which is permitted, at least
by an international agreement formalizing competition by South African
athletes in another country. Short of the jus cogens argument, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights,3 the Advisory Opinion on
Namibia,3 5 and the norms of the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 6 suffice to megitimize offi-
cial racism. The latter convention provides as follows:
Article 2(1):
(b) Each State Party undertakes not to sponsor, defend or support ra-
cial discrimination by any persons or organizations.
(c) Each State Party shall take effective measures to review governmen-
tal, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any
laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuat-
ing racial discrimination wherever it exists;
Article 3:
States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and
undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature
31 Olympic Charter, supra note 2, at Rule 3.
Id. at Rule 9.
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(Ill, U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
" 1971 LC.J. 16.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter cited as Discrimination
Convention].
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in territories under their jurisdiction."'
The Supervisory Committee established under that Convention explicitly
interpreted Article 3 to impose on States Parties an affirmative duty to
implement the condemnation of apartheid.38 The general practice of
states is of particular interest in evidencing opinio juris. As of 1981, 92 of
the 107 States Parties had taken steps to prohibit South African
sportsmen from entering their territories. Of the remaining 15 States,
only eight have continued to allow South African athletes to compete in
their territory.39
The clear recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly
Declaration against Apartheid in Sports is of particular significance to
nonparties to the Convention. 0 The Declaration provides as follows:
"States shall deny visas and/or entry to representatives of sports bodies,
members of teams or individual sportsmen from any country practising
apartheid.' 1 In the New Zealand case of Ashby v. Minister of Immigra-
tion,'4 2 the plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin the defendant from grant-
ing temporary permits which would enable the Springboks, a South Afri-
can rugby team, to enter the country for the purpose of competition with
local teams. Their case rested on two grounds: that the Convention pre-
vented the Minister of Immigration from issuing entry permits, and that
the Minister at least should have explicitly taken the Convention into
account, as he had failed to do. The court adopted the orthodox view of
British Commonwealth countries; in the absence of an Act of Parliament,
as here, a treaty does not become a part of municipal law. The court also
expressed the opinion that the immigration authorities had properly exer-
cised their discretion within the flexible language of the Convention. One
Justice suggested, however, that the New Zealand government was con-
strained by the Gleneagles Agreement, a British Commonwealth measure
against apartheid in sports.
Thus, even though it may be discretionary, a boycott to combat offi-
cial racism seems valid. Indeed, states may have an obligation to prevent
South African athletes from competing on their soil. Secondary boycotts,
however, may be invalid.4'3 Thus, it may be abusive for a State to boycott
competition involving athletes from another State whose only involve-
s7 Discrimination Convention, supra note 36, at arts. 2(1) and 3. On the several injunc-
tions against racism, see B. WESTON, R. FALK, & A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER 615-16 (1980).
" Ashby v. Minister of Immigration, [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R. 222, 227-28.
39 Id. at 228.
40 U.N. Monthly Chronicle, 32 U.N. GAOR at 122, G.A. Res. 105(m) (1978).
41 Id.
42 [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R. 222.
43 Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 5, at 285-86.
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ment was to allow its athletes to compete against South Africans.
B. Boycotts to Implement Geopolitical Strategy
Sports boycotts for geopolitical purposes are not protected by posi-
tive international law. They must therefore by analyzed on a case-by-case
basis, according to the general principles governing reprisals. The argu-
ment that no sports boycott can be illegal has some merit. Sports boy-
cotts are nonmilitary, yet they often send a clear and prominent signal.
Sports boycotts avoid the sometimes inhumane effects of food and other
trade embargoes, and are easy for governments to control.44 Arguments to
this effect must, however, presume that boycotts impose little harm on
athletes. Unfortunately, national boycotts often harm athletes and their
careers, are seldom effective and tend to harden diplomatic positions,
while counterproductively generating boycott cycles. 45 In the sports arena,
a "boycott, as a tool for bringing about political change, has been effective
only in the case of small and relatively defenseless countries. '48 It must
be remembered, also, that boycotts instituted for this purpose patently
violate Rules 3, 9, and 24 of the Olympic Charter,47 and at least the first
three of four fundamental Principles of the Olympic Charter. According
to those principles, found in Rule 1 of the Charter, any organization play-
ing a part in the Olympic movement' 8 must respect the "aims of the
Olympic movement," as follows:
to promote the development of those physical and moral qualities which
are the basis of sport;
to educate young people through sport in a spirit of better understanding
between each other and of friendship, thereby helping to build a better
and more peaceful world;
to spread the Olympic principles throughout the world, thereby creating
international goodwill;
to bring together the athletes of the world in the great four-yearly sport
festival, the Olympic Games."9
Thus, sports boycotts are neither valid nor invalid per se. Some sports
boycotts for geopolitical reasons do not respond to illegal acts, as for ex-
ample, refusals to allow United States athletes to compete in Cuba. Re-
taliation by the use of such boycotts is illegal because they are not only
unfriendly acts, but violations of customary sports law, as evidenced by
44 Note, This Sporting Life, 13 MELBouRN U.L. REv. 264 (1981).
45 Nafziger, supra note 12, at 72-73.
4e Cheffers, The Foolishness of Boycott and Exclusion in the Olympic Movement, 1979
OLv.Ywic Rnv. 512, at 513.
4' See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
,8 Olympic Charter, supra note 2, at Rule 4.
4 Id. at Rule 1.
1983
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
the rules and principles of the Olympic Charter.
Most sports boycotts do, however, seem to respond to illegal acts. Let
us assume, at the second step in the legal appraisal of retaliation, that
governments impose boycotts only after a demand for either termination
of the illegal act by the other state or a request for a peaceful resolution
of a bilateral dispute under Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter.5 0
Also, let us assume for purposes of argument, that a hypothetical boycott
is necessary and not grossly disproportional. The boycott may still be in-
valid if its purpose is neither to deter nor to induce reparation from the
offending state. Further, a boycott may be invalid if its purpose is unclear
or if it offends human experience and good faith. Thus, for example, the
United States compulsion of a private boycott by its athletes of the Mos-
cow Games was unacceptable under international law because the pur-
pose was equivocal, and may have simply been a bad faith effort to de-
tract from the glitter and propaganda value of an adversary's hospitality
and home advantage in the competitions between United States and Rus-
sian athletes. 1 Similarly, boycotts of fully integrated South African
teams, or of competition against individual black South African athletes,
are at least suspect if the purpose is diplomatic rather than human rights-
oriented. The rules of international sports law would thus permit lifting
the human rights veil to invalidate unacceptable political claims articu-
lated in terms of human rights.
On the other hand, unilateral suspension of Argentinian-British soc-
cer competition at the 1982 World Cup, had it occurred, would have been
acceptable in the context of the Falklands War between the two states.
Examples are few because customary sports law has been lex ferenda
only in recent years. Until recently, therefore, sports boycotts were ir-
rebuttable under the Lotus dictum.52
IV. A RECOMMENDATION: THE DRAFT DECLARATION RELATING TO THE
PROTECTION OF THE OLYMPIC GAMs
In 1982 the IOC adopted a Draft Declaration relating to the protec-
tion of the Olympic Games,53 for presentatio4 to the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly. Although the General Assembly has not yet reviewed the
Declaration, it merits attention. If adopted eventually, the Declaration
50 "All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHAsR-
TmR art. 2, para. 3.
0' See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
52 "Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot. . . be presumed." The Case
of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.
1982 OLYMPIc REv. 481-82, See infra Appendix to this article for the full text of the
Declaration.
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would confirm the rules and principles of international sports within the
United Nations framework. The IOC opted for a declaration rather than
a draft convention as "a much less complex and difficult procedure."
The clear intent was not only to constrain governments more strongly,
but to establish the rules of the Olympic Charter as international law.55
Of course, the I0C considered that it had to limit the Declaration's appli-
cability to the Olympic Movement because other sports competitions are
not universal 5 6 However, that limitation may be deemed to be pro forma,
without prejudice to more comprehensive, and realistic, applicability of
the Declaration. The I0C selected the General Assembly rather than
UNESCO or another specialized forum because it recognized that the
subject matter of the Declaration is essentially political and not
technical.57
The Declaration is in two parts. The preamble concisely itemizes
those Rules of the Olympic Charter with international political implica-
tions. "[T]he most critical element in the declaration" 5 is paragraph 7 in
the first part, which expresses the desire to protect competition "from the
adverse consequence of international tensions." The actual Declaration
provides for: 1) recognition and protection by states of the Olympic
Games, 2) freedom of access for athletes and officials to Olympic sites, 3)
non-discrimination other than to further the aims of the Olympic Move-
ment, and 4) respect by states for their National Olympic Committees."'
Although the I0C somewhat ambiguously stated that the Declaration "is
not primarily an anti-boycott proposal,"60 the official explanation of the
third paragraph of the Declaration is instructive. That paragraph and its
official explanation read as follows:
3. that Member States shall refrain from an[y] discrimination by reason
of race, religion or politics and from any action in relation to the Olympic
Games for purposes other than furthering the aims of the Olympic
Movement. 1
aId. at 482.
55 Id.
Id. at 483.
57 Id. at 482.
" Id. at 484.
5 Id. at 482.
0Id. (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 482; see infra Appendix.
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Official Explanation
Declaration Three
This reinforces the anti-discrimination provision which the General As-
sembly has previously stated and prohibits the use of the Olympic
Games for purposes other than those involved in the Olympic
Movement.6
2
V. CONCLUSION
International sports competition can function in several ways as a
nonaggressive sanction. The use of sports for the purpose of official pro-
test is controversial. Whether protest measures are valid depends upon a
distinction between the use and abuse of sports as a nonaggressive sanc-
tion. The criteria for making this distinction under international law are
the principles of retorsion and reprisal, and the rules and principles of
customary sports law. The latter is largely defined in the Olympic Char-
ter, which applied comprehensively to international sports competition,
supplemented by such norms as those in the Helsinki Accords. The Draft
Declaration relating to the Protection of the Olympic Games, if adopted
by the United Nations, would confirm the international legal character of
the Olympic rules.
As applied to nonaggressive sanctions against competitors and com-
petitions, international norms seem to condone boycotts to combat
apartheid and other forms of official racism. These norms however, re-
quire a more detailed case-by-case analysis when it comes to the geopolit-
ical use of sports as a means of official protest. The international norms
of sports competition would also permit lifting the human rights veil to
invalidate unacceptable political claims articulated in terms of human
rights.
62 Id. at 484.
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Appendix
The Draft Declaration Relating to the Protection of the
Olympic Games
1. Taking note of the spirit of the Olympic principles which govern the
organization of the Olympic Games.
2. Endorsing the following aims of the Olympic Movement:
a) to promote the development of those physical and moral quali-
ties which are the basis of sport;
b) to educate young people through sport in a spirit of better un-
derstanding between each other and of friendship, thereby help-
ing to build a better and more peaceful world;
c) to spread the Olympic principles throughout the world, thereby
creating international goodwill;
d) to bring together the athletes of the world in the great four-
yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games.
3. Noting with satisfaction that consistent with other declarations of the
General Assembly, the Olympic Movement prohibits discrimination
on the grounds of race, religion or politics.
4. Recalling its belief that international sporting contacts based on the
Olympic principles can play a positive role in promoting peace and
the development of friendly relations among nations of the world.
5. Desirous of preserving the Olympic Games as a celebration of the
aims and objectives of the Olympic Movement, to be organised and
held in the best possible conditions and with the widest possible
participation.
6. Desirous also of facilitating participating in the Olympic Games by
athletes and officials from all National Olympic Committees
recognised by the International Olympic Committee.
7. Desirous also of protecting the celebration of the Olympic Games
from the possible adverse consequence of international tensions.
8. Noting also that selection of host cities for the Olympic Games by the
International Olympic Committee is and should be based solely on
the ability of such cities to organise the Olympic Games.
declares:
1. that Member States shall recognise and protect the celebration of the
Olympic Games.
2. that free and unhindered access to Olympic sites and venues be
granted to Olympic athletes and officials during the Olympic Games
and a reasonable period prior to and immediately thereafter.
3. that Member States shall refrain from any discrimination by reason
of race, religion or politics and from any action in relation to the
Olympic Games for purposes other than furthering the aims of the
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Olympic Movement.
4. that Member States shall respect the purpose and tasks of the Na-
tional Olympic Committees in their territories recognised by the In-
ternational Olympic Committee.
